Fixtures in the Landlord-Tenant Relationship
A lease is an agreement by which a tenant is allowed temporarily to
exploit a landowner's property for his own benefit. Since the land itself
is but one of several factors in the production of wealth,1 the tenant
may have to employ such additional resources as manpower, machines,
2
or buildings in order to derive income from the use of the premises.
The law of fixtures, which deals with property rights in chattels affixed
to the land,3 determines the interests of the parties in a large portion of
these added resources.
This comment analyzes the economic effect of the law of fixtures on
the landlord-tenant relationship. It first shows that fixtures law has
been used in the past as a device for implementing the economic objectives of protecting the landlord, encouraging the tenant's commercial activity, and promoting the public interest in conserving land
resources. It then examines these functions in the light of modem
technological advances and techniques of capital management. The
results of this examination suggest (1) that the protection of the landlord can be accomplished more effectively by replacing existing fixtures
tests with a system in which the tenant compensates the landlord for
the physical damage to the freehold caused by removal; and (2) that
it is no longer necessary to interject considerations of conservation and
economic efficiency into landlord-tenant fixtures law.
I.

CONFLIcTING

ECONOMIc OBjEcrrVEs

The legal rules which govern tenants' rights to the wealth added to
the leasehold are often a product of the general economic objectives
that the law seeks to achieve. The conflicting economic considerations
See ELY & WARREN, LAND ECONOMICS 113-17 (1940).
When property such as a furnished apartment is rented for consumer purposes,
comparatively few additions are usually made. Even in this case, however, appliances
and furnishings may be added or existing items replaced.
3 A fixture is a chattel which, while retaining its separate physical identity, is associated
in some manner with realty. Depending on the legal relationships between the parties
involved, it may be considered as either real or personal property. See generally 5
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 19 (Casner ed. 1952); BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 137-57
651-60 (1962); Bingham, Some Suggestions
(2d ed. 1955); 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
Concerning the Law of Fixtures, 7 COLUm. L. REv. 1 (1907); Horowitz, The Law of
Fixtures in California-A Critical Analysis, 26 So. CAL. L. REv. 21 (1952); Niles, The
Intention Test in the Law of Fixtures, 12 N.Y.U.L. REv. 66 (1934).
I

2
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that underlie problems of tenants' fixtures today are reflected in the
development of the common law in three areas: the "attachment" test
in the law of fixtures, used to conserve land resources; the trade fixtures
exception to the attachment test, used to stimulate commercial exploitation of the leased property; and the rules of waste, used to protect the
interests of the landlord.
Conserving Land Resources: The Attachment Test
Many of the early fixtures cases were contests between the heir of a
landowner, who claimed a fixture as part of the realty, and the deceased's executor, who claimed it as personalty. Adopting the Roman
maxim, "whatever is attached to the land becomes land,"'4 the English
courts generally held that anything connected to the freehold was realty
and therefore belonged to the heir.5 An opinion in one of the early
decisions recognized the economic waste involved in dismantling a
functioning economic unit: "[W]hen [chattels] are fixed they are for
the continual profit of the house; and therefore it is more reasonable
that the heir should have them, to whom the freehold to which they
are joined belongs, than the executors, who have nothing to do with
'6
the freehold."
The liberality of the common law in favor of the heir reflected in
public policy the economic fact that it may be wasteful to allow the
removal of valuable annexations from the land.7 An integrated, func4 The transformation of the Roman aphorism into a rule of law is generally considered
to be based on a misunderstanding of the Roman law of accession. See Niles, The
Rationale of the Law of Fixtures: English Cases, 11 N.Y.U.L. REv. 560, 561-64 (1934).
5 See Y.B. Mich. 20 Hen. 7, 13, pl. 24 (1505) (furnace connected to a wall was realty);
Y.B. Trin. 21 Hen. 7, 26, p1. 4 (1506) (furnace resting on the ground and vats on the floor
of a brewhouse were realty).
6 Y.B. Trin. 21 Hen. 7, 27, pl. 4 (1506) (Kingsmil, J.), quoted in AMos & FERARD,
FrxTrums 153 (2d ed. 1847).
7 From an economic point of view, it is meaningless to divide a unit of property into
the value of the land and the value of a building or other annexation. The analysis below
is adopted from TURVEY, THE ECONOMICS OF REAL PROPERTY 23 (1957):

The following magnitudes can be ascertained or estimated:
T =the market value of the building on a site,
R = the replacement cost of the- building,
T'=the market value the property would have if the building on it were new and
represented the highest and best (most profitable) use of the site,
C =the cost of constructing such a building,
S = T' - C, market value of the site.
If S exceeds T by more than the cost of demolition (net of scrap value), it will pay to
demolish the building. Thus, it might be said that T could be divided into S and (T - 5),
the value of the building, since if (T-5) is positive, it represents the sum which would
justly compensate the owner for removal of the building. Nobody, however, will ever offer
to pay (T- S), so it is not in any sense a "market" value. In short, since a building must
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tioning economic unit has a "going value" s that is greater than the
value of the sum of its component parts. By adopting a rule in inheritance cases that restricted the removability of annexations, the English
courts attempted to preserve this "going value." 9
The early common law made no distinction between chattels affixed
to the land by a deceased landowner and chattels added by a tenant for
years. The maxim "whatever is attached to land becomes land" was
rigorously applied against tenants,' 0 and decisions in landlord-tenant
cases were frequently based on whether the particular annexation
would be "realty" if the contest were between an heir and an executor.'1
The property interest of the tenant in his annexation was thus subordinated to the public policy formulated in the inheritance cases of
conserving land resources.
12
Encouraging Trade: The Trade Fixtures Exception

As fixtures law developed, English courts modified the attachment
rule with respect to fixtures attached by a tenant "for the convenience
of his trade.' 13 The exception to the general conservation policy of the
ordinarily be used in conjunction with land, it cannot be bought and sold as if it were
floating in air.
Alternatively, it might be said that T could be divided between R, the value of the
the value of the site. However, since an old building may be as
building, and (T-R),
useful for certain purposes as a new one, R may be irrelevant to any proposed action, and
thus it cannot be called a "market" value.
8 Cf. Banner Milling Co. v. State, 240 N.Y. 533, 544, 148 N.E. 668, 672 (1925), assessing
damages in condemnation proceedings: "The claimant is entitled to compensation, not
merely for so much land, so much brick, lumber, materials and machinery considered
separately, but if they have been combined, adjusted, synchronized and perfected into
an efficient functioning unit of property, then it must be paid for that unit .... In that
limited sense, it is entitled to the 'going value' . . . of its physical property."
9 A desire to maintain the "going value" of a unit of land appears to have influenced
the judicial response to various problems of fixtures law. See, e.g., Voorhis v. Freeman, 2
W. & S. 116 (Pa. 1841), in which the Pennsylvania "industrial plant" doctrine was formulated to protect a going business concern from attaching creditors. In holding that
the real estate mortgage of a factory included machinery that was not annexed to the
freehold, the court emphasized that selling individual pieces of the going unit would
cause economic loss. Id. at 119.
10 A tenant was guilty of waste when he removed chattels which he had annexed to
the freehold. CoKE, COMMENTARY ON LITTLETON *53a.
11 See Herlakenden's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 62a, 63b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1025, 1030 (K.B. 1589).
12 The term "trade fixture" is used by different courts with various meanings. See,
e.g., Sherburne Corp. v. Town of Sherburne, 124 Vt. 481, 483, 207 A.2d 125, 127 (1965):
"Fixtures usually are classed as real estate; trade fixtures, an exception to the rule, are
usually classed as personal property." As used in this comment, "trade fixture" refers
to a chattel affixed to the land by a tenant for purposes of trade. No assumption is made
as to whether it is realty or personalty. Cf. note 35 infra.
13 Poole's Case, 1 Salk. 368, 91 Eng. Rep. 320 (K.B. 1703). The court held that a soap
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attachment test was justified as encouraging the development of land
resources for commercial purposes, "which is become the pillar of the
state."'1 As one court stated: "What tenant will lay out his money in
costly improvements of the land, if he must leave everything behind
which can be said to be annexed to it?"'15
The trade fixtures exception was economically sound in the period
of commercial growth during which the rule developed. 16 Long term
commercial leases, which today protect a tenant desiring to make large
capital expenditures, were not widely used until the nineteenth century."7 Creditors of the tenant, lacking the protection of modem
security devices,' 8 would have been less willing to extend credit
when the tenant's property might become "realty" and therefore immune to attachment. 19 Finally, the industrial development of the period caused a change in the relative value of the chattels brought onto
the premises, thereby magnifying the hardship caused by losing at20
tached items.
Protecting the Landlord: Rules Against Waste
The law of fixtures was historically related to rules against waste
designed to protect the landlord against injury to the realty. 21 Early
maker could remove boiling vats during the leasehold term. However: "IThere was a
difference between what the soap-boiler did to carry on his trade, and what he did to
complete the house, as hearths and chimney-pieces, which [were] not removable." Ibid.
14 Penton v. Robart, 2 East 88, 90, 102 Eng. Rep. 802, 303 (K.B. 1801). See also
Cameron v. Oakland County Gas & Oil Co., 277 Mich. 442, 452, 269 N.W. 227, 330 (1936):
"The right of the tenant to remove the erections . . . is one founded upon public
policy ... that every person shall be encouraged to make the most beneficial use of his
property the circumstances will admit of."
15 Penton v. Robart, 2 East 88, 90, 102 Eng. Rep. 302, 303 (K.B. 1801).
16 The growth of the exception is generally considered to have paralleled the emergence of the commercial class in England during the fifteenth century. See Casenote, I
CALIF. L. R v. 192, 194 (1913). But cf. Niles, The Rationale of the Law of Fixtures:English
Cases, 11 N.Y.U.L. REV. 560, 564 n.37 (1934) (arguing that the trade fixtures rule antedates
the commercial development).
17 See HOLDSWORTH, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAND LAw 233 (1927). Compare
the restrictive effect on agricultural tenants' investments where the prevailing tenancy
is from year to year. Cotton, Regulations of Farm Landlord-Tenant Relationships, 4
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 508, 517 (1937).
18 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313.

Cf. Royal Store Fixture Co. v. Patten, 183
Pa. Super. 249, 130 A.2d 271 (1957), and Butler v. Butler's Diner, 81 R.I. 43, 98 A2d 875
(1953), allowing creditors to remove buildings erected by the tenant.
19 The leading trade fixtures case involved a contest between a landlord and an
attaching creditor of the tenant. Poole's Case, 1 Salk. 368, 91 Eng. Rep. 320 (K.B. 1703).
20 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 19.2, at 11 (Casner ed. 1952).
21 Both the law of fixtures and rules prohibiting a tenant's waste have their origins
in common law actions for injury to real property. See BRONSON, FIXTURES § 4, at 11

(1904).
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English cases held that when a tenant's chattel was placed on the
leasehold in such a manner that its removal would cause damage to
22
the landlord's building, it became a fixture and part of the freehold.
If the tenant removed the item, he would be injuring the realty and
23
therefore committing an act of waste.
By making possible an action for waste when removal of a chattel
would damage the premises, the law of fixtures furnished the landlord
with legal 24 and equitable 25 devices for protecting the original value of
the leasehold. As a result, it subordinated the tenant's interest in items
attached to the premises to a policy of protecting the landlord's original
investment in the land.
II.

AMERICAN FIXTURES LAW: TIHE SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE TEST

The leading American fixtures case of Teaff v. Hewitt26 was decided

during a period of American judicial hostility to the harshness of the
English attachment rule.27 The court in Teaff rejected attachment and
based its decision as to when a chattel becomes realty upon
the intention of the party making the annexation, to make the
article a permanent accession to the freehold-this intention
being inferred from the nature of the article affixed, the relation and situation of the party making the annexation, the
structure and mode of annexation, and the purpose or use for
2
which the annexation has been made. 8
22 See Amos & FERARD, Fixruars 89 (2d ed. 1847).

23 See CoR, COMMENTARY ON LinrLON "53a. See also Graffell v. Honeysuckle, 30 Wash.
2d 390, 191 P.2d 858 (1948) and Roanoke Marble & Granite Co. v. Standard Gas Sc Oil Co.,
155 Va. 249, 154 S.E. 518 (1930), holding a tenant guilty of waste for removing a fixture. At
early common law, affixing the chattel was itself an act of waste. See 5 AMERICAN LAw OF
PROPERTY § 20.11 (Casner ed. 1952).
24 See AMos & FERmAR,
FrxruaRs 270-80 (2d ed. 1847).
25 Id. at 281-88.
26 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853).
27 The trade fixtures exception to the attachment test was strictly limited to articles
affixed for commercial and ornamental purposes. See Elwes v. Maw, 3 East 38, 102 Eng.
Rep. 510 (K.B. 1802), refusing to extend the exception to agricultural fixtures. American
courts, more sympathetic to tenants generally, and farmers in particular, frequently
refused to follow the English cases and allowed removal for agricultural and other
tenants. See Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137 (1829); Whiting v. Brastow, 21 Mass.
(4 Pick.) 310 (1826); Holmes v. Tremper, 20 Johns. R. 29 (N.Y. 1822).
28 1 Ohio St. at 530 (emphasis in the original). Although commonly called the "intention" test, the rule in Teaff v. Hewitt has three distinct parts: "I. Actual annexation to
the realty, or something appurtenant thereto. 2. Appropriation to the use or purpose
of that part of the realty with which it is connected. 3. The intention of the party
making the annexation ....
" Ibid. The first two criteria are not helpful in landlordtenant cases. Many of the tenant's chattels are annexed sufficiently to satisfy the test as
between, e.g., a vendor and a purchaser. See Shields v. Hansen, 201 Wis. 349, 230 N.W. 51
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Because the intention formula included "the relation of the party,"
it tended to favor removal of a tenant's annexation. As the court explained: "When ...

a tenant erects expensive structures.., which can

be removed without their destruction or material injury to the freehold, the presumption is a rational one, that it was not the intention
of the tenant to make them permanent accessions to the freehold, and
thereby donations to the owner of it."29
The intention test of Teaff has today become the verbal formula by
which fixtures cases are resolved.3 0 However, as a practical means of
determining when the title of a chattel passes to the landlord, a search
for the "intention" of the tenant is not useful.3 1 As the court indicated
in Teaff,32 this intent is inferred from a substantial loss of value in the
chattel or the realty.33 Since substantial damage is the criterion by
which intent is judged, objective intent is merely a correlative of the
4 Thus, although
extent of injury to the leasehold or the annexation.U
(1930). And since the trade fixtures exception is based on fulfilling the economic purpose
to which the realty is devoted, the adaptability of the chattel makes the item more rather
than less removable.
29 1 Ohio St. at 531 (emphasis in the original).
30 See, e.g., Anderson-Tully Co. v. United States, 189 F.2d 192 (5th Cir. 1951); Biallas
v. March, 305 Mich. 401, 9 N.W.2d 655 (1943); Endler v. State Bank & Trust Co., 352 Mo.
961, 180 S.W.2d 596 (1944); Handler v. Horns, 2 N.J. 18, 65 A.2d 523 (1949); Berry v.
Heinel Motors, Inc., 162 Pa. Super. 52, 56 A.2d 374 (1948); Becwar v. Bear, 41 Wash. 2d
37, 246 P.2d 1110 (1952); Auto Acceptance & Loan Corp. v. Kelm, 18 Wis. 2d 178, 118
N.W.2d 175 (1962). Some states have statutes on tenants' fixtures, which often are held
to be declaratory of the common law intention test. See CAL. CIV. CODE 9 1019; GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 61-109, 61-110 (1951); IDAHo CODE ANN. § 55-308 (1957); ILL. Ry. STAT. ch. 80,
§ 34 (1965); MONT. REv. CoDEs ANN. § 67-1307 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-04 (1960);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 334 (1963); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 34-17-2 (1956); S.D. CODE
§ 51.1103 (1939). However, some statutes, listing common law exceptions for articles affixed
for purposes of "trade, manufacture, ornament or domestic use" have been interpreted
to prevent the removal of agricultural fixtures. See Cotton, supra note 17, at 518, and
cases cited therein.
31 The intention test is criticized in Horowitz, supra note 3, and Niles, supra note 3.
32 See text accompanying note 29 supra.
33 Substantial damage caused by removal is said to be an "objective inference" of an
intention by the tenant permanently to annex the chattel to the premises. See 2 AIGLER,
SMITH
TEFFT, PROPERTY 397 (1960).
34 Similarly, the tenant's "subjective intent" is not controlling, since if he installs his
chattel in such a manner that it cannot be removed without substantial damage to itself
or the realty, he loses his right of removal regardless of his secret thoughts as to owner-

ship. See 5 AMERICAN

LAW OF PROPERTY §

19.11, at 40-41 (Casner ed. 1952).

An agreement by the parties concerning the disposition of the chattel will be honored,
as when installing the item is part of the consideration for the lease. See, e.g., Warren
Post 23, American Legion v. Jones, 302 Ky. 861, 196 S.W.2d 726 (1946). However, there
must be a clear indication that a bargain was intended, and general provisions giving
the landlord title to all "alterations, additions, and improvements" usually do not transfer title to the tenant's annexations. See Cattie v. Joseph P. Cattie & Bros., 403 Pa. 161,
168 A.2d 313 (1961); Hartberg v. American Founders' Sec. Co., 212 Wis. 104, 249 N.W.

1967]

Landlords, Tenants and Fixtures

courts often speak in terms of "objective intent," the underlying consideration is the amount of damage caused by removing the chattel.3 5
Damage to the Freehold
The distinction between items found to be attached to the freehold
with "a purpose to make them part of the building"3 6 and items attached without such intent frequently depends, as indicated above, on
whether removing the fixture would cause "substantial damage" to the
leased property.3 7 When the removal of the item would cause the virtual destruction of the premises, as would the removal of an automatic
sprinkling system which has become an integral part of the building,
8
courts uniformly hold that title to the item passes to the landlord.
However, when the destruction would be less than total, courts differ
over what amount of damage is substantial enough to award the fixture
to the landlord.3 9 Some decisions have allowed removal even though it
48 (1933); Comment, Effect of Lessee's "Covenant to Leave Improvements" on the Doctrine
of Trade Fixtures, 24 WASH. L. Rlv. 154, 158-59 (1949); cf. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v.
Fox Theatres Corp., 164 F. Supp. 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
35 Cf. 5 A.IERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY § 19.11, at 41 (Casner ed. 1952). Another unsuccess-

ful aspect of the intention test is the attempt to formulate a "test of uniform application"
for determining when a chattel "becomes realty." See Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 52425 (1853). But cf. 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 19.12, at 53 & n.33 (Casner ed. 1952)
(stating that there is not one but many concepts of what is a fixture). Attempts to classify
a tenant's fixture as real or personal property for all purposes are futile. A tenant's fixture
has been held personalty in cases involving attachment by a creditor or trustee in bankruptcy, Freeman v. Dawson, 110 U.S. 264 (1884), and sale under the statute of frauds,
Cameron v. Robbins, 141 Ark. 607, 218 S.W. 173 (1920). It has been held realty for purposes
of condemnation, In re Allen Street, 256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 377 (1931), and taxation, Bank
of America v. County of Los Angeles, 224 Cal. App. 2d 108, 36 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1964). Contra,
Sherburne Corp. v. Town of Sherburne, 124 Vt. 481, 207 A.2d 125 (1965). It has been considered a combination of the two in the determination of when the item must be removed
from the premises in order for the tenant to retain his title. See Kerr v. Kingsbury, 39 Mich.

150 (1878); 5 AMEaRCAN

LAw OF PROPERTY,

supra, § 19.11, at 43-45; Brown, op. cit supra

note 3, § 147. For illogical results caused by the ambiguous nature of a tenant's fixtures,
compare Mullins v. Sturgill, 191 Va. 653, 66 S.E.2d 483 (1951) (mining equipment weighing
over 6V2 tons was personalty and therefore removable after the expiration of the lease), with
In re Slum Clearance, City of Detroit, 332 Mich. 485, 52 N.W.2d 195 (1952) (molten metal
and chemical solutions in tanks were compensable in condemnation of the realty).
386Winnike v. Heyman, 185 Iowa 114, 169 N.W. 631 (1918).
37 See, e.g., Kornblum v. Henry Mangels Co., 167 So. 2d 16 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964) (tenant's
refrigeration plant doors removed by using blowtorch); Sanders v. Butte Motor Co., 142
Mont. 524, 385 P.2d 263 (1963) (new room constructed in leased building).
38 Red Diamond Clothing Co. v. Steidemann, 169 Mo. App. 306, 152 S.W. 609 (1912).
39 The application of the "substantial damage" test has brought widespread confusion.
See Frost v. Schinkel, 121 Neb. 784, 792-93, 238 N.W. 659, 664 (1931): "Perhaps there are
no subjects in law more difficult to deal with than the questions raised as to fixtures....
The cases are legion; and each new case seems only the more to disturb any fixed or
certain rule that seemed deductible from former cases,"
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necessitated taking down a brick wall 40 or tearing up concrete foundations.41 Others have denied removal when only surface damage to a
floor was involved.

42

Much of the confusion regarding "substantial damage" is due to the
restrictive nature of the test. Since the possibility of reimbursement by
the tenant for injury to the premises is irrelevant in determining
whether damage to the freehold is "substantial," 43 the test provides no
method for balancing the physical destruction caused by removal
against the value of the chattel or its possible alternative use elsewhere.
The failure of the courts to arrive at a meaningful definition of "substantial" may be due to their tendency to measure physical damage to
the realty in the light of the amount of economic loss involved in
removal. 44
The narrow scope of the "substantial damage" test frequently leads
to unsatisfactory results. For example, when a tenant replaces an old
article placed on the property by the landlord with a new item of his
own, it is generally held that removal of the old item extinguishes the
tenant's right to the new one. 45 Such a reversal of interests, without
regard to the values involved, may give an unmerited windfall to the
landlord.
A solution to the problems of' the "substantial damage" test could
be fouid in making the tenant's right of removing his annexation
conditional solely upon his reimbursing the landlord by the amount
necessary to restore the premises to their original condition.46 Such a
40 Rothery v. Dohrse, 122 Neb. 259, 240 N.W. 296 (1932).
41 Shields v. Hansen, 201 Wis. 849, 280 N.W. 51 (1930).
42 Gordon v. Cohn, 220 Cal. 193, 30 P.2d 19 (1934); Graffell v. Honeysuckle, 30 Wash.
2d 390, 191 P.2d 858 (1948).
43 Alden v. Mayfield, 168 Cal. 798, 127 Pac. 44 (1912); Davidson v. Ginsberg, 190 Iowa
1327, 181 N.W. 661 (1921).
44 The "substantial damage" test seems aimed at retaining on the premises those
chattels which it would be economically unwise to remove: the measure of damages for
wrongful removal is not only the cost of repairing the premises, but also the value of the
items taken. Kornblum v. Henry Mangels Co., 167 So. 2d 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964);
Slane v. Curtis, 41 Wyo. 402, 286 Pac. 372, rehearing denied, 41 Wyo. 417, 288 Pac. 12
(1930).
45 Kain v. Coble, 132 N.J.L. 815, 40 A.2d 350, aff'd, 133 N.J.L. 340, 44 A.2d 211 (1945);
McHale v. Rosenblatt, 56 R.I. 120, 184 Ad. 172 (1936); McKemie v. Waldrop, 190 S.W.2d
384 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945); Auto Acceptance & Loan Corp. v. Kelm, 18 Wis. 2d 178, 118
N.W.2d 175 (1962); Rosenblum v. Terry Carpenter, Inc., 62 Wyo. 417, 174 P.2d 142 (1946).
46 Cf. UNIFORM COMMFRCLAL CODE § 9-313(5): "[A] secured party . .. may .. . remove
his collateral from the real estate but he must reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of
the real estate ... for the cost of repair of any physical injury, but not for any diminution in value of the real estate caused by the absence of the goods removed or by any
necessity for replacing them."
Where tenants have stated their willingness to pay for damages to the realty caused
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system would protect both the landlord, since the original value of
his realty would not be diminished 4 7 and the tenant, since he could
freely replace existing items without fear of forfeiture. In addition,
it would resolve disputes with a minimum of economic waste, since
presumably the tenant would remove only those articles whose resale or
use value is greater than the cost of removal plus the cost of repairing
48
the premises.
Although a reimbursement system would resolve most conflicts over
fixtures which the tenant seeks to remove from the premises, there may
be instances where money damages will not be sufficient to protect the
landlord's interests. In such cases, courts should be allowed to fashion
suitable equitable relief. An example of such a situation is Woodson
Oil Co. v. Pruett,49 in which the tenant sought to take its oil well
equipment from a producing well at the end of the term. The court,
believing that removal of the equipment would permanently destroy
by removal, courts have been liberal in allowing severance. See Kenneally v. Standard
Electronics Corp., 364 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1966); Rothery v. Dohrse, 122 Neb. 259, 240
N.W. 296 (1932); 399-41 Market Street Corp. v. Darling Stores, 355 Pa. 312, 49 A.2d 686
(1946). Occasionally removal has been conditioned upon payment of damages or other
action by the tenant to protect the landlord's interest. See Bergh v. Herring Safe Co., 136
Fed. 368 (2d Cir. 1905); Woodson Oil Co. v. Pruett, 298 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957),
discussed in text at note 49 infra. More frequently, however, the right of removal is
determined by the amount of damage that would be caused to the realty, without
reference to reimbursement. See Alden v. Mayfield, 163 Cal. 793, 127 Pac. 44 (1912), and
Davidson v. Ginsberg, 190 Iowa 1327, 181 N.W. 661 (1921), stating that it is irrelevant
that the tenant is willing to repair the damage caused by removal.
47 In Dudzick v. Lewis, 175 Tenn. 246, 133 S.W.2d 496 (1939), the court considered
the premises damaged because removal of the annexation reduced the value of the
property. Under the proposed test, the value to be protected is that of the original
leasehold, ordinary wear and tear excepted. An agreement between the parties concerning
the disposition of an annexation will be respected, however. Cf. note 34 supra.
48 If the value of the chattel as part of the premises is great enough, the tenant will
wish to sell it to the landlord. See text accompanying notes 72-74 infra.
An alternative to the rule proposed above would be to compel the landlord to pay the
tenant the value of chattels affixed to the premises at the end of the term. While this
might encourage high level maintenance of the leasehold (since the tenant would be
compensated for the unexpired value of improvements at the end of the term), it would
unnecessarily curtail the landlord's ability effectively to utilize the land after the expiration of the lease. In order to change the use to which the premises are devoted, the landlord would either have to insert a provision in the lease providing for removal of those
improvements he did not wish to retain, or else take a loss on attached chattels not suited
to the new use of the premises by scrapping them. Thus, the landlord must either have
anticipated the new use in advance or pay the unnecessary cost of chattels he will not
use. Flexibility in land use would consequently be restricted.
Under the proposed rule, high level maintenance of the premises can still be encouraged. At any time during the period of the lease, the landlord can bargain for
improvements whose life expectancy will extend beyond the leasehold term.
49 298 S.W.2d 856 (rex. Civ. App. 1957). See also Eubank v. Twin Mountain Oil Corp.,
406 S.W.2d 789 (rex. Civ. App. 1966).
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the well, refused to allow removal until after the well stopped pro-.
ducing. However, it ordered that until such time the lessee be paid a
reasonable rental for the equipment.
Damage to the Attached Chattel
The criterion of "substantial damage" is applied by some courts not
only in cases of damage to the realty, but also where the attached chattel itself is injured by removal.50 When the affixed item can be removed
only by tearing it to rubble, as with a large building with concrete
foundations, the addition has been considered a permanent part of the
realty. 51 Similarly, if the value of the chattel when removed is considerably less than its value when left in place, as with an item especially
designed for the particular premises, 52 removal has frequently been
prohibited. In one case, an elaborate air conditioning unit was installed
in the premises in such a manner that forty per cent of the cost of
installation would be lost in removing it. Although the court found
that the system could be removed without substantial damage to the
53
building, it held that the unit was a permanent part of the realty.
An apparently parallel line of authority has rejected loss of value in
the attached item as a criterion for transferring ownership to the landlord.54 Courts have allowed tenants to destroy entire buildings, 55 even
when the only value in so doing was for wrecking purposes. 56 In Cattie
v. Joseph P. Cattie & Brothers,57 the court permitted an industrial
crane to be torn apart and sold as scrap. It was irrelevant that the de-struction reduced the value of the equipment from $69,200 to $10,414. 58
50 See Della Corp. v. Diamond, 210 A.2d 847 (Del. 1965); John P. Squire & Co. v. City
of Portland, 106 Me. 234, 76 Atl. 679 (1909); Collamore v. Gillis, 149 Mass. 578, 22 N.E.
46 (1889); Delano v. Tennent, 138 Wash. 39, 244 Pac. 273 (1926).
51 Haskins v. Kelly, 192 Misc. 366, 78 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1948). Contra, Dickerman v. Town
of Pittsford, 116 Vt. 563, 80 A.2d 529 (1951).
52 Della Corp. v. Diamond, 210 A.2d 847 (Del. 1965) (carpeting cut specially for the
premises not removable).
53 900 Main, Inc. v. Houston, 150 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
54 See, e.g., Andrews v. Williams, 115 Colo. 478, 173 P.2d 882 (1946); Baker v. McClurg,
198 Il1. 28, 64 N.E. 701 (1902).
55 Cameron v. Oakland County Gas & Oil Co., 277 Mich. 442, 269 N.W. 227 (1936);
General Petroleum Corp. v. Schefter, 141 Ore. 349, 16 P.2d 645 (1932); cf. Van Ness v.
Packard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 146 (1829), applying the trade fixtures exception: "[t]he
question, whether removable or not, does not depend upon the form or size of the
building, whether it has a brick foundation or not, or is one or two stories high, or has
a brick or other chimney. The sole question is, whether it is designed for purposes of
trade or not."
56 See Cameron v. Oakland County Gas & Oil Co., 277 Mich. 442, 462, 269 N.W. 227,
234 (1936), where the dissent pointed out that the only value the tenant's building would
have when severed from the land was scrap.
57 403 Pa. 161, 168 A.2d 313 (1961).
58 Id. at 163, 168 A.2d at 314.
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The decisions recognizing substantial loss of value in the fixture as
a basis for transferring ownership to the landlord are founded on a
policy of minimizing the economic loss caused by dismantling the annexation. 59 It should be noted that the interest protected in these cases
is not that of the landlord, since even if removal is allowed the landlord must recover the premises in the same condition in which they
were letC0 Rather, the rule rests on public policy considerations of
minimizing the loss involved in separating attached chattels from the
land. Thus, the test of substantial damage to the attached item is based
on the same considerations that led early English courts to apply the
attachment test in contests between heirs and executors.
The criterion of "substantial damage" to the attached chattel, like
the attachment rule in English inheritance cases, tends to reduce the
loss involved in the operation of a given economic unit.61 However,

the consequences of making a tenant's annexations part of the realty
differ from those in the inheritance cases. In the latter, the court's function is to divide items among parties who previbusly had no interest in
them. The landlord-tenant relationship, on the other hand, is not designed to effect a transfer of interest to the landlord. Awarding the
landlord the tenant's chattel not only gives him an unmerited and unintended acquisition of property, it also imposes financial loss on the
tenant. If the public interest in preserving land resources is to be implemented in landlord-tenant cases, its weight must be great enough
62
to override the harsh effect on tenants.

The rule denying removal when substantial injury to the attached
items occurs is based on two assumptions: (1) that keeping the fixture
on the land will conserve economic resources; and (2) that the saving
of resources justifies depriving the tenant of the fixture. In order to
evaluate the merits of the nonremoval rule, each of these assumptions
must be examined.
59 In Whitehead v. Bennett, 27 L.J. Ch. (n.s.) 474, 475 (1858), the court held that while
the tenant was allowed to dismantle and remove a small machine which could easily be
reassembled elsewhere, he could not remove a brick building, presumably because the
court felt that the economic waste involved in reducing the building to its primary
materials would be excessive. Accord, Collamore v. Gillis, 149 Mass. 578, 22 N.E. 46 (1889).
60 See Baker v. McCurg, 198 Ill. 28, 35, 64 N.E. 701, 704 (1902); "The landlord is not
affected by an injury done by the tenant to the latter's own property."
61 See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
62 The economic soundness of the conservation policy as applied to tenants is open to
question. Unlike the heir or executor in the inheritance case, the tenant owns the
chattel in question. The premise that society's interests can be advanced by an involuntary transfer of ownership seems to contradict the classical economic assumption
that the owner of a unit of property is best able to determine the economically appropriate use of that property. When the conservation policy is applied to landlord-tenant
cases, society's interest in preserving the given economic unit must be weighed against
society's interest in preserving unimpaired investment and the free flow of capital.
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1. The Mechanics of Conserving Resources. In certain circumstances

the law recognizes that removing a chattel affixed to the land will substantially reduce the item's value. Where real property is condemned,
tenants may be awarded damages for chattels which admittedly would
63
be removable from the premises as personalty at the end of the lease.
Similarly, where realty is assessed for taxation purposes, a tenant's removable annexation may be of so much value in relation to the rest
of the property as to be taxable as part of the land.64
A distinction must be made, however, between the condemnation
and taxation cases, where the value of the chattel as part of the economic unit is considered at some point during the lease period, and
the "substantial damage" criterion, which deals with this value at the
end of the term.65 Although a chattel's value as part of the premises
may be high during the lease, it does not follow that it will remain so
after the term. 6
At the time when the attachment rule, with its emphasis on preserving land resources, was developed in England, there frequently was
little difference between the value of an attached chattel during and
63 See United States v. 15.3 Acres of Land, 154 F. Supp. 770 (M.D. Pa. 1957); Gilbert
v. State ex tel. Morrison, 85 Ariz. 321, 338 P.2d 787 (1959); Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y.2d
285, 189 N.E.2d 606, 239 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1963); Milburn By-Products Coal Co. v. Eagle Land
Co., 141 W. Va. 866, 98 S.E.2d 231 (1956). In In re Acquiring Certain Property on the
North River in the City of New York, 118 App. Div. 865, 866-67, 103 N.Y.S. 908, 909 (1907),
the court stated: "It would be manifestly unjust to treat such property as personal
property, when its value after it was severed from the building would be a very small
percentage of its value as a part of the building for the use of the tenants in the
business which they were conducting."
64 See Pajaro Valley Bank v. County of Santa Cruz, 207 Cal. App. 2d 621, 24 Cal. Rptr.
639 (1962).
65 The condemnation cases differ not only as to the time at which the value is
considered, but also as to the tenant's anticipated use of the chattel, and therefore its
value to him. At the expiration of the lease, the tenant has chosen to remove the
fixture and eliminate its integrated value. In the condemnation case, however, he has not
made such a choice, and presumably he does not wish to see the item removed. The
results in both cases tend to favor the tenant, by considering the item removable
"personalty" in landlord-tenant cases, and by compensating the tenant for its value as
"realty" in condemnation proceedings. See generally 4 NIcHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 18.12
(1962); Comment, Compensation for a Lessee's Trade Fixtures in Condemnation Proceedings, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 1215 (1966).
66 But see Matter of the City of New York (Allen Street), 256 N.Y. 286, 176 N.E. 377
(1931), refusing to consider as a factor in assessing the value of a chattel the fact that
the lease was due to expire in five months. The court pointed out that the expiration
date of the lease was not necessarily the time when the chattel would be removed:
"[P]erhaps the parties might have chosen to preserve that value either by renewal of the
lease or by transfer of title to the fixtures from the tenant to the owner of the fee.
Choice lay with the tenant and landlord, and how that choice would have been exercised
rests in speculation which does not concern the courts in this jurisdiction." Id. at 249,
176 N.E. at 381.
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after the lease. According to the customs of the period, commercial
leases were usually short term.67 If a tenant installed an item such as
a building that involved large capital expenditure, the value of the
chattel was often considerable after the expiration of the term. If the
parties failed to renew the lease, the loss involved in removal justified
transferring ownership to the landlord.
The modem developments of long term commercial leases and improved capital planning techniques have minimized the value of the affixed item after the end of the lease. With the ability to bargain for a
leasehold term that matches the life expectancy of his additions, a tenant
today will adjust the period of the lease so that he obtains the maximum value from his most expensive inputs of production. 68 Simply
stated, a tenant normally will not put a valuable machine with a life
6
expectancy of fifty years in a building which he leases for ten years. 9
Because of the minimal value of the addition at the end of the lease,
a chattel remaining on the land after the term is likely either to have
a short life expectancy or to be valuable principally as scrap. If scrap
is the principal value of the chattel, it makes no difference in terms of
society's resources whether this value is realized by the landlord or the
tenant. Since there is no saving of economic resources by transferring
ownership to the landlord, the justification for refusing to permit the
tenant to remove the item is absent.
Certain businesses, such as small retail stores, often take leases on a
short term basis. In these cases, it is likely that chattels whose life expectancy is greater than the term of the lease will be affixed to the land.
It might be argued that in such instances the conservation policy of
preserving the value of the chattel as part of the premises should be
given effect. However, it is in these cases that the considerations of
allowing removability which underlie the old trade fixtures rule 70 are
most important. The retail merchant who takes a short term lease frequently is in need of credit. Making his annexations the property of
the landlord would hamper his dealings with creditors and restrict his
business activity. Since the fixtures installed by short term lessees are
unlikely to be of considerable value, the conservation policy of making
such annexations permanent would appear to be outweighed by its
detrimental effect on the tenant's ability to operate on credit. 71
67

See note 17 supra.

Alternatively, he will bargain for a lease that gives him an option to renew.
69 This is likely to be true whether or not the tenant is allowed to remove the item
at the end of the lease, since he wishes to avoid the cost of dismantling, removing, and
reinstalling the item. However, if the tenant does install an item which he plans to
remove, it will be one whose removability can be effected with minimal cost.
70 See text accompanying notes 12-20 supra.
71 Creditors have frequently claimed a tenant's annexations to satisfy their claims.
68

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 34:617

The rule transferring ownership of a chattel to the landlord when
removal would cause loss of value is based on the proposition that a
valuable annexation should not be removed from the premises because
it is part of the operating land unit. Courts applying the rule assume
that a tenant will take from the premises all items to which he has
title. However, if the value of the chattel as part of the land is great
enough, both the landlord and the tenant will want to keep it on the
premises. The landlord will wish to buy the annexation, since its presence enhances the value of his property. The tenant will be willing to
sell it, since he will not have to bear the cost of dismantling, removing,
and reinstalling the item.7 2 It is thus likely that when the value of the
fixture is great, it will remain on the premises despite the tenant's ownership,73 and the loss entailed by removal will be avoided. 74
See Uncle Sam Oil Co. v. Union Petroleum Co., 90 Old. 135, 216 P. 443 (1923); Hartberg v.
American Founders Securities Co., 212 Wis. 104, 249 N.W. 48 (1933) (attaching creditors).
Ridgefield Investors v. Holloway, 75 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1954); Butler v. Butler's Diner, 81 R.I.
43, 98 A.2d 875 (1953); Auto Acceptance & Loan Corp. v. Kelm, 18 Wis. 2d 178, 118 N.W.2d
175 (1962) (chattel mortgagees). Kenneally v. Standard Electronics Corp., 364 F.2d 642 (8th
Cir. 1966) (conditional vendor).
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, it will become easier in the future for creditors
to obtain security interests in fixtures. See generally Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 HARv. L. Rv. 1319 (1962); Coogan, FixturesUniformity in Words or in Fact?, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1186 (1965); Gilmore, The Purchase
Money Priority, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1333 (1963); Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 64 CoLUM. L. RFv. 44 (1964); Shanker, An Integrated Financing System
for Purchase Money Collateral,73 YAiE L.J. 788 (1964). However, a tenant's fixtures may
well prove a source of difficulty because of the conflicting rules on financing chattels and
fixtures. Compare UNIFORa COMMERCiAL CODE § 9-312 with § 9-313. Although a tenant's
annexations will normally be considered chattels, see Kripke, supra at 66-69, peculiarities
of local law may render them "realty" and subject to claims by holders of interest in the
freehold. See Adams v. Chamberlin, 54 Ga. App. 459, 188 S.E. 550 (1936), and Guthrie
v. Jones, 108 Mass. 191 (1871), stating that a tenant's removable annexations are "realty"
while in place, and authorities cited notes 37, 38, 42, and 43, supra, where annexations
are considered "realty" under the "substantial damage" test. In addition, the tenant may
purchase the land from the landlord, rendering his annexations "fixtures" as against a
subsequent mortgage of the realty. See Thompson & Co. v. Lewis, 120 Ark. 252, 179 S.W.
343 (1915). The problem of security interests in a tenant's annexations is one of the
many unresolved difficulties under the fixtures section of the Code. See articles cited supra.
72 It is also possible that the parties will renew the lease or that the tenant will
purchase the freehold from the landlord.
73 Controversies over a tenant's annexations frequently involve determination of title
while the chattel is still on the premises. Banks v. Clintworth, 201 Cal. App. 2d 789, 20
Cal. Rptr. 431 (1962); Woodson Oil Co. v. Pruett, 298 S.W.2d 856 (rex. Civ. App. 1957)
(declaratory judgment). Frost v. Schinkel, 121 Neb. 784, 238 N.W. 659 (1931); Killlan v.
Hubbard, 69 S.D. 289, 9 N.W.2d 700 (1943) (injunction against removal). Eubank v. Twin
Mountain Oil Corp., 406 S.W.2d 789 (rex. Civ. App. 1966) (suit to quiet title).
74 The ability of the landlord and tenant to determine rights in the chattel may lead
to harassment or coercion by one of the parties. In Cattie v. Joseph P. Cattle & Bros.,
403 Pa. 161, 168 A.2d 313 (1961), discussed at note 58 supra, the tenant scrapped his annexations of $10,414 rather than sell them to the landlord for $20,000. Id. at 163-64, 168
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In conclusion, it appears that the rule making an attached item irremovable if severing it would cause damage to the item fails to fulfill
the purpose of conserving land resources. Due to modem leasing and
input practices the most expensive and valuable additions, which are
the ones society has the most interest in preserving, are likely to be
valuable only as scrap at the end of the term. In businesses where short
term leases are the prevailing practice, considerations of encouraging
economic activity weigh against awarding attached chattels to the landlord. Finally, it should be noted that giving the tenant the right to
remove his annexations does not necessarily mean that they will be
taken from the land, since the landlord usually may purchase the items
at the end of the term.
2. The Policy of Conservation. The rule prohibiting the tenant

from removing a fixture when the item would be damaged is similar
to the English attachment rule as a device for promoting the public policy of preserving land resources.7 5 The development of this public policy
occurred during a period when the productivity of a unit of land was
considerably less than it is today. At the time when the attachment rule
was used to make a tenant's annexation realty, the value of a machine
or a building annexed to the freehold was considerable in terms of
the amount of wealth the property was capable of yielding. In relation
to the productivity potential of the land, the removal of an affixed
chattel was a great loss.
Modern technological advances 76 have lessened the consequences to
society of the removal of a tenant's annexation. The improved efficiency and greater productivity brought by technological development
77
have made possible a higher economic return to a given unit of land.

Because of the increased productivity potential of the land, the wealth
lost by the tenant's removal represents a smaller proportion of what
the land is capable of producing than it did during the period of the
attachment test. Thus, the saving of society's land resources through a
non-removal rule is now reduced.
In view of the diminished significance of the law of fixtures as a
device for preserving land resources, the rule prohibiting the tenant
from removing a chattel when damage to the item would result should
A.2d at 314. However, the possibility of harassment exists whether or not the tenant
has the right to remove his annexations. In Cattie, for example, the landlord apparently
terminated the lease in order to acquire title to the items.
75 See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
76 Technological change may be defined as "a change in the parameters of a production
function resulting directly from the use of new knowledge." See Stout & Ruttar, Patterns
of Technological Change in American Agriculture, 40 J. FARM ECON. 196-207 (1958).
77 Cf. Baker, Productivity Potentials of New Technologies Related to Land, in MoDERN
LAND Poucy 103, 104-07 (1960).
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be reconsidered. Refusing the tenant the right of removal not only
deprives him of his property, it also has the collateral disadvantage of
8
discouraging his economic activity7
III. CONCLUSION

The law of fixtures in landlord-tenant relations serves two purposes,
protection of the landlord and conservation of land resources. In both
these objectives, the current state of the law is unsatisfactory: protection
of the landlord could more effectively be accomplished by making the
tenant's right to remove his fixtures conditional on reimbursing the
landlord for physical damage caused by severance; and the policy of
preserving land resources is not only being unsuccessfully pursued, but
it is of dubious importance in view of modem productive capacity.
78 See note 62 supra, and text accompanying notes 12-20 supra.

